

Message Text

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ACTION SY-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02
SS-15 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 AF-10 PRS-01 /072 W
-----060548Z 021961 /11

R 051502Z MAY 77
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4765
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 7693

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PROP US
SUBJECT: FORGERY OF US DOCUMENT

REF: CAIRO 7669

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF FORGERY REFERRED TO IN REFTEL:
2. BEGIN TEXT.

FRIENDS: SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE SENT TWO REPORTS ON HIS
MIDEAST TOUR TO PRESIDENT CARTER. I HAVE NOT READ THE REPORT
WRITTEN BY VANCE'S AIDES WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED HIM ON THIS TRIP;
THE REPORT WAS ONLY SIGNED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HOWEVER, I
HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO READ THE REPORT WRITTEN BY VANCE HIMSELF.
IT CONTAINS HIS IMPRESSIONS AND VIEWS AS WELL AS THE HINTS OF
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US POLICY AND TACTICS IN THE ARAB PART OF THE WORLD AS I
CONSIDER IT A PLOT I HAVE SUMMARIZED THE PRINCIPAL THOUGHTS OF
THE REPORT AND ARRANGED FOR THEIR LARGE-SCALE DISSEMINATION.
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO PUBLISH THEM IN THE PAPERS. MY
IDENTITY WOULD BE REVEALED AND MY LIFE ENDANGERED. THEREFORE,
I APPEAL TO ALL THE HONEST JOURNALISTS TO INFORM THE WHOLE WORLD
ABOUT THIS PLOT.

EXCERPTS FROM VANCE'S REPORT

ISRAEL

(1) THE TALKS CONFIRMED AND ELABORATED ISRAEL'S STANDPOINT WHICH IS WELL-KNOWN.

(2) THE PRESENT INTERNAL PROBLEMS LIMIT ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY MOVES.

(3) RABIN IS OPTIMISTIC AND CONFIDENT. HE HAS A GOOD REASON FOR HIS OPTIMISM AND CONFIDENCE.

(A) WE SHALL RESPECT RABIN'S OUTRIGHT REFUSAL OF THE PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS. THIS ATTITUDE WILL SERVE AS A PROOF THAT WE HAVE FREED OURSELVES FROM THE ACTIONS AFFECTING OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR CLOSEST AND MOST RELIABLE ALLIES IN THE PAST.

(B) IT TURNED OUT THAT OUR PAST APPROACH HAD UNDERMINED ISRAEL'S CONFIDENCE AS FAR AS SINCERITY OF OUR ACTIONS IS CONCERNED. OUR FUTURE STEPS HAVE TO BE INFLUENCED BY THIS FACT SO THAT THE ISRAELI LEADERS MAY BE ABLE TO SEE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

(C) FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, ISRAEL IS IRREPLACEABLE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND RUSSIAN INFILTRATION IN THE REGION.

(D) I UNDERLINE RABIN'S WORDS: "MOST PEOPLE LIVING EAST OF THE JORDAN RIVER ARE PALESTINIANS. THEREFORE, THE PROBLEM MAY BE REDUCED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHERE, IN FACT, SHOULD BE ISRAEL'S EASTERN BORDER? ON THE JORDAN RIVER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PALESTINIAN HOMELAND IS EAST OF THE ISRAELI BORDER." THIS IDEA WAS ALREADY VOICED IN THE US. IT COULD BE PROMOTED AGAIN AND REGARDED AS ONE OF THE POSSIBLE POSITIONS. SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD NOT OPPOSE IT.

(E) ISRAEL IS STRONG ENOUGH, THE ARABS ARE SPLIT. CONSE-
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QUENTLY, THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT ISRAEL FROM HOLDING ON TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND DICTATING TERMS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

(F) THIS CAN BE ACCEPTED IN SPITE OF COMPLICATIONS WHICH WILL BE CAUSED EVEN TU US.

EGYPT

(A) THE TALKS WITH SADAT PROCEEDED AS EXPECTED.

(B) SADAT WAS EAGER TO PURSUADE US THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER HIM KEY PERSONALITY AMONG THE ARABS.

(C) EGYPT, YES. EGYPT IS OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE. THIS DOES NOT APPLY TO SADAT, HOWEVER.

(D) SADAT MAY EVEN THINK THAT EGYPT COULD TAKE OVER ISRAEL'S ROLE.

(E) HIS CONCEPTS OF WHAT THE US SHOULD DO IN RELATION TO EGYPT ARE UNREALISTIC, EVEN ABSURD.

(F) IT IS HARDLY POSSIBLE FOR OUR MIDEAST POLICY TO BE TOO CLOSELY LINKED WITH SADAT.

(G) I WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE PAID MORE RESPECT TO

RABIN THAN TO ASSAD AND ARAFAT.

(H) AS FAR AS THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IS CONCERNED, SADAT WILL GO STILL FURTHER. IN FACT, HE WILL NOT OPPOSE OUR PLANS.

(I) WHILE IN THE US, HE WILL BE ANXIOUS TO GET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE WILL BE RELUCTANT TO SEE THE LOGIC OF OUR ARGUMENTS. THERE IS NO NEED TO WORRY ABOUT IT. OUR REFUSAL WILL NOT CHANGE HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD US IN THE LEAST. HE HAS NOWHERE TO RETURN ANY LONGER.

(J) SADAT'S FUTURE IS UNCERTAIN BECAUSE OF EGYPT'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT. IT IS NECESSARY TO DECIDE WHETHER HE CONTINUES TO BE A SUITABLE PARTNER. IF THE ANSWER IS AFFIRMATIVE IT IS NECESSARY TO GIVE HIM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.

(K) HE IS WILLING TO GIVE UP A CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE TERRITORY, PROVIDED THAT HE IS ALLOWED TO PASS OFF THIS GESTURE AS HIS OWN VICTORY. I TOLD HIM THAT SHARM EL SHEIKH WAS AMONG THE TERRITORIES ISRAEL WAS NOT PREPARED TO LEAVE. HE WAS NOT SURPRISED. HE WILL CONNIVE AT IT.

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(1) WE SHOULD INDUCE THE OIL-RICH ARAB NATIONS TO SOLVE EGYPT'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES.

JORDAN

(A) THE TALKS WENT ON UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE EVENTS WHICH HAD PRECEDED THEM.

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INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05

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-----060547Z 037671 /11

R 051502Z MAY 77

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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(B) THE KING WAS DISGUSTED WITH THE WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE. HE BLAMES US FOR OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SCANDAL. HE SAYS THAT THE US WILL BE THE ONLY LOSER BECAUSE OF THIS INDISCRETION. HE HIMSELF BELIEVES THAT IT WILL NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO TAKE CARE OF THE CONSEQUENCIES OF WHAT WAS REVEALED.

(C) I RECOMMENDED HIM, WITHOUT BEATING ABOUT THE BUSH, TO BRING THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION UNDER CONTROL. I HINTED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT SYRIA FROM BRINGING THE ARMED PALESTINIANS UNDER ITS INFLUENCE. THERE SHOULD BE ONLY ONE JORDANIAN DELEGATION AT GENEVA WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE PALESTINIANS--ESPECIALLY THE WEST BANKERS. THE KING AGREED.

(D) HE OPPOSED THE ANNULMENT OF THE RABAT SUMMIT DECISIONS.
(E) I FEEL HE IS INCLINED TO THINK THAT WE INTEND TO ESTABLISH A PALESTINIAN STATE EVEN ON THE EAST BANK OF THE JORDAN RIVER. HE IS AFRAID THAT HE COULD NOT BE THE RULER OF SUCH STATE.
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(F) KING HUSSEIN CO-OPERATES WITH SYRIA, BUT HE IS SCARED OF IT. HE IS WORKING AGAINST SYRIA IN QUITE A FEW DIRECTIONS. THE JORDANIANS SAY: "WE WERE WARNED NOT TO COOPERATE WITH THE BAATHIST REGIME IN SYRIA. THE RESULT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF, HOWEVER. THE BAATHIST PARTY HAS NOT GROWN STRONG ENOUGH IN JORDAN, BUT SYRIA'S BAATHIST PARTY IS TURNING ITS BACK UPON RUSSIA."

(G) KING HUSSEIN IS THE RULER OF A SMALL COUNTRY. HE KNOWS HE IS IN DANGER. BUT HE RELIES ON HIS ABILITY TO MANEUVER TO GET ALONG WITH THE ARABS AS WELL AS WITH THE US AND GREAT BRITAIN.

SAUDI ARABIA

(A) KHALED'S ABSENCE WAS A POSITIVE FACTOR AS FAR AS THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS WAS CONCERNED. FAHD WAS CANDID, MATTER-OF-FACT.

(B) HIS VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN EGYPT, LEBANON, SYRIA AND JORDAN CONFIRMS OUR CONCLUSIONS. HE AGREES THAT PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO ASSAD WHO MIGHT BE WILLING TO SETTLE THE PALESTINE PROBLEMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR CONCEPT.

(C) IT WAS HE WHO STRESSED THAT WE MUST NOT ALLOW SYRIA TO GAIN CONTROL OVER THE PALESTINIAN ARMED MOVEMENT. HE KNOWS THAT IT WOULD THREATEN SAUDI ARABIA, TOO.

(D) HE AGREES THAT THE PALESTINIAN ARMED MOVEMENT HINDERS IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR MUTUAL POLICY.

(E) HE WARNED US NOT TO EXAGGERATE OUR TRUST IN SADAT. HE DOES NOT THINK SADAT'S FALL WILL LEAD TO COMPLICATIONS. (THE SAUDIS MAY BE DOING SOMETHING IN THIS RESPECT WITHOUT TELLING US).

(F) HE AGREES EVEN TO A RADICAL STEP TO CHANGE THE WHOLE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP.

(G) HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ATTENTION HAD TO BE FOCUSED ON IRAQ AND LIBYA, THAT THE TWO NATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE ISOLATED AT LEAST.

(H) THE SAUDIS KNOW THAT THE ARABS ARE UNABLE TO UNLEASH A VICTORIOUS WAR AT PRESENT. SO THEY ENDEAVOR TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

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(I) FAHD ENDORSED THE WELL-KNOWN INTERPRETATION OF SAUDI ARABIA'S OIL POLICY. HE ASSURED US THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO WORRY ABOUT OIL EMBARGO.

SYRIA

(A) GENERALLY, MY IMPRESSION WAS GOOD.

(B) ASSAD IS ALSO FLEXIBLE, BUT HE HAS A SENSE OF REALITY.

(C) OUR INTENTION HAVE TURNED OUT TO BE JUSTIFIED. OUR ACTIONS INSIDE THE COUNTRY SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED. SYRIA'S NECESSITIES OF LIFE ARE ONE OF THE WAYS TO ACHIEVE IT.

(D) SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND OTHER COUNTRIES STRIVE TO LIQUIDATE ASSAD'S REGIME. CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ HELP TO REACH THE SAME GOAL. THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE WEAKENING ONE ANOTHER. ASSAD IS LIKELY TO KNOW IT BUT HE CANNOT HELP IT. THIS LEADS TO SOFTENING OF HIS POLICY--A POSSIBLE CAUSE OF YET UNPREDICTABLE REVERSALS.

(E) SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON WAS VERY USEFUL. SYRIA IS UNABLE TO SOLVE LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. INVASION OF LEBANON WEAKENED ASSAD'S REGIME FROM POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. FOR A LONG TIME, ASSAD THUS ELIMINATED DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYRIAN ARMY IN A CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL.

(NOWADAYS, ASSAD, TOO, IS WILLING TO AGREE TO SUBSTANTIAL TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL.

GENERAL

(A) ARMED CONFLICT IS NOT IMMINENT. SO THERE IS NO NEED TO REACH A SETTLEMENT IN A HURRY. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE MAY BE A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO DELAYS.

(B) ISRAEL NEEDS TIME TO SOLVE ITS INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THE TIME MAY BE GIVEN.

(C) TIME IS ALSO NEEDED TO REACH SOLUTION AND CHANGES CONCERNING THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT.

(D) SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER NATIONS, TOO, NEED TIME TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM OF ASSAD AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS OF THIS KIND.

(E) POSTPONEMENT OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WILL NEITHER CREATE NOR EXACERBATE THE CRISIS, FOR THE BALANCE OF FORCES SHOWS

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ISRAEL'S SUPERIORITY QUITE CLEARLY. THE ARABS ARE AWARE OF IT.

(F) STEP BY STEP? THIS MAY STILL BE THE BEST THING FOR
US AND OUR ALLIES.

(G) THE QUESTION OF TIME FOR BOTH SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL
TO SETTLE THE RED SEA QUESTIONS IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT. END TEXT.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DOCUMENTS, FORGERY
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 05-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977CAIRO07693
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770159-0155
Format: TEL
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770591/aaaadats.tel
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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 CAIRO 7669
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
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Review Release Event: n/a
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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
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Status: NATIVE
Subject: FORGERY OF US DOCUMENT
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To: STATE
Type: TE
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Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009